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Abstract.
In a two-sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The
matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent. Be-
havioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the surplus.
The frequency of behavioral types is determined in equilibrium. Even if the frequency
of behavioral types is negligible, they aect the terms of trade and eciency. In an
unbalanced market where the entering ow of one side is short, there is one-sided rep-
utation building in bargaining, and commitment types on the short side determine the
terms of trade. In a balanced market where the entering ows are equal, there is two-
sided reputation building in bargaining, and reputation concerns lead to ineciency.
An equilibrium with persistent delays is constructed. The magnitude of ineciency is
determined by the demands of the commitment types and is independent of their fre-
quency. Access to the market exacerbates bargaining ineciencies caused by behavioral
types, even at the frictionless limit of complete rationality.
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1. Introduction and related literature
Outcomes of bilateral dynamic interactions, where agents are rational (i.e., not behav-
ioral), can be drastically dierent from outcomes of bilateral interactions, where there is
even a small amount of incomplete information concerning the rationality (or the \type")
of the agents.
1 Bilateral bargaining outcomes are also highly sensitive to the outside op-
tions of the bargaining agents.
2 However, outside options and the distribution of types
available for trade are typically determined by aggregate market forces. In turn, some
prominent large markets are agglomerations of many bilateral bargaining relationships.
3
For large markets economic intuition suggests that the impact of a small number of \be-
havioral" agents on aggregate equilibrium variables should be small. But this intuition
suggests a tension between the impact of behavioral agents in bilateral relationships and
the eect of behavioral agents in a large market. To highlight this tension we analyze
a bilateral bargaining relationship within the context of a larger market comprised of
rational agents and a small number of behavioral agents. We explore how incentives
driven by aggregate market forces and incentives generated during bilateral bargaining
interact to determine equilibrium outcomes.
Consider a two player alternating oers bargaining game over a unit surplus where the
time between oers is arbitrarily small. Under complete information the unique perfect
equilibrium of the bargaining game is the Rubinstein (1982) outcome (see also Shaked
and Sutton (1984), Sutton (1986) and Perry and Reny (1993)).
Suppose instead that there is incomplete information about the type of player 1. In
particular, if agent 1 is potentially a (strategically inexible) \commitment" type that
insists on portion 1 of the bargaining surplus, and player 2 is a fully rational normal
type with certainty, then player 1 obtains 1 and player 2 receives 1   1 in any perfect
equilibrium, even if the probability that player 1 is a commitment type is arbitrarily
small (the one-sided reputation result of Myerson (1991)).
In addition to player 1, suppose that there is also incomplete information about the
type of player 2. In particular, if both players are potentially commitment types that
demand 1 and 2, then a war of attrition ensues, and the unique equilibrium payo
1See, Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982), Fudenberg and Levine (1989) and Fuden-
berg and Levine (1992) for demonstrations of this phenomenon in repeated games; or Myerson (1991),
Kambe (1999), Abreu and Gul (2000), Compte and Jehiel (2002), or Abreu and Pearce (2007) for
examples in bilateral bargaining.
2See, for example, Compte and Jehiel (2002).
3The labor market and the housing market are particular examples of such markets. For economic
models of such markets see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990, 1985) and Serrano and Yosha (1993), or
see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for a more complete overview. Related work on bargaining and
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prole is inecient with the \weak" agent (agent i) receiving 1   j and the \strong"
agent receiving strictly less than j (the two-sided reputation result of Abreu and Gul
(2000)). However, now suppose that both players have access to an outside option. If
agent i's outside option exceeds 1   j and j's outside option is less than 1   i, then
player i never yields to j, eliminating the incentive for j to build a reputation, and the
outcome is identical to the one-sided incomplete information case where i receives i and
j receives 1 i (Lemma 1). Moreover, if both agents' outside options dominate yielding
to the commitment type, then the incentive to build a reputation is entirely eliminated,
and the unique equilibrium is again the Rubinstein outcome (Compte and Jehiel (2002)).
As outlined above, the outcome of bilateral bargaining depends heavily on the distri-
bution over agent types while the distribution over agent types is an endogenous variable
determined in a market equilibrium. In turn, the market equilibrium may depend on bar-
gaining outcomes: agents that are traded infrequently, but that nevertheless obtain high
values, are plentiful; while agents that are traded very frequently, or agents that have
very low values, are scarce. Also, the bargaining outcome depends crucially on the out-
side options of agents, and again, outside options are endogenous variables determined in
equilibrium. An agent that enjoys favorable bargaining outcomes will typically be more
optimistic about his outside option than an agent who is less successful in bargaining.
To address the aforementioned issues of endogeneity, we present a two-sided search
model where agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The two sides of the market
can be thought of as buyers and sellers of a homogeneous good. The matching market
serves as the endogenous outside option for agents in a bargaining relationship. In each
period, a constant measure of agents enters the market. Agents exit the market through
successfully making a trade, or they leave voluntarily because there are no protable
trading opportunities in the market. A fraction of the entering population on each side
is comprised of commitment types. The steady state frequency of behavioral types in
the market is determined in equilibrium, and if the entering fraction of behavioral types
is small, then so is the equilibrium frequency of behavioral types.
A central nding of this paper is that even a negligible number of behavioral agents
signicantly aect equilibrium outcomes, that is, equilibrium bargaining behavior, equi-
librium terms of trade and outside options.4 Compte and Jehiel (2002) demonstrated that
if the outside options of normal types are suciently high, then commitment types have
no eect on bargaining outcomes. In the market analyzed here, however, the endogenous
outside options of the normal types are never large enough to deter the commitment
types. In equilibrium, some normal types always trade with commitment types. This,
4In all the results described, the time between oers in the bargaining stage is assumed arbitrarily small.BARGAINING AND REPUTATION 5
in turn, makes rational agents in the market excessively greedy in bargaining. Conse-
quently, even if behavioral types are negligible, they substantially aect the terms of
trade and the eciency of the bilateral bargaining outcome.
Although behavioral agents always have an impact on the bilateral outcome, the nature
of their eect depends on aggregate forces. We focus on two cases: an unbalanced market
where the entering ow of one side is short, and a balanced market where the entering
ows of the two sides are equal. Unbalanced markets entail one-sided reputation building;
and balanced markets entail two-sided reputation building, in equilibrium. Note that
commitment types are present on both sides regardless of whether the market is balanced
or unbalanced. Nevertheless, in an unbalanced market, only the short-side chooses to
imitate the commitment types, whereas, in a balanced market, both sides imitate the
commitment types.
In an unbalanced market, a fraction of the agents in the long side of the market must
be leaving the market without trading in any steady state. Consequently, aggregate ows
ensure that the outside option of the long-side is compatible with the demands of the
commitment types while the outside option of the short-side is incompatible. However,
if the short-side's outside option is incompatible and the long-side's outside option is
compatible with the commitment type demands, then equilibrium play in the bargaining
stage involves one-sided reputation building by agents on the short-side.
In balanced markets, the eects of the commitment types are most pronounced. In
equilibrium, aggregate forces ensure that the outside options of both sides are compatible
with the inexible demands of the commitment types. So, the magnitude of ineciency
is determined by the inexible demands of the commitment types. In order to further
investigate the impact of the commitment types on the market and provide a direct
comparison with previous literature, we construct an analytically tractable equilibrium
that exhibits dynamics similar to previous models of two-sided reputation (Abreu and Gul
(2000) and Compte and Jehiel (2002)). In this equilibrium the normal types play a war
of attrition and always trade. A normal type of side 2 always trades with a commitment
type of side 1 but a normal type of side 1 opts out against the commitment type with
positive probability. Bargaining is inecient and the ineciency is caused by delays
in reaching an agreement. As the fraction of commitment types entering the market
approaches zero, the steady-state frequency of commitment types present in the market
and the probability that a normal type of side 1 opts out against the commitment type
also converge to zero. However, in sharp contrast to existing literature (Abreu and Gul
(2000) and Compte and Jehiel (2002)), the ineciency (manifested as delay) persists,
even at the limit without commitment types. Consequently, the mere availability of6 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
outside market is sucient to magnify the impact of commitment types and leads to
substantial inter-bargaining ineciency.
1.1. Outline of the paper. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
basic model. Section 3 presents a baseline for comparison by characterizing equilibria in a
model without any commitment types. Section 4 analyzes the bargaining stage game and
presents the required interim results. Section 5 presents the main one-sided reputation
result for unbalanced markets. Section 6 presents the main two-sided reputation result
for balanced markets. Section 6.1 constructs an inecient equilibrium with two sided
reputation building for balanced market and section 6.2 provides the comparative statics
for the constructed equilibrium. All proofs are in the appendix.
2. The model
In each period agents belonging to two classes i 2 f1;2g (for example, buyers and
sellers) enter a matching market. Mass Li of agents enter from each class. We assume,
without loss of generality, that L2  L1. Of the class i agents entering the market a
fraction zi are commitment types and the remaining 1   zi are normal types. We refer
to an agent from class 1 as agent 1 or him and to an agent from class 2 as agent 2 or
her. We refer to normal type agents from class 1 and class 2 as player 1 and player
2, respectively. Also, we refer to commitment type agents from class 1 and class 2 as
commitment type 1 and commitment type 2, respectively.
In each period a portion of the unmatched agents in the market are randomly paired
with a potential trading partner from the opposite class to play a bilateral bargaining
game. In each bilateral bargaining game a unit surplus is available for division between
the paired agents. Agents only receive utility if they can agree on the division of the
unit surplus. If two matched agents agree on the division of the unit surplus, then they
trade. Agents that trade leave the market permanently. The division of the unit surplus
is determined in an alternating oers bargaining game with the possibility of opting out.
In the alternating oers bargaining game agent 1 is the proposer in the odd periods
and agent 2 is the proposer in the even periods. The proposer can make an oer or can
opt-out and terminate the bargaining relationship. If the proposer chooses to make an
oer, then he/she proposes a division of the unit surplus. The responder can accept the
oer, reject the oer or can opt-out and terminate the bargaining relationship. If agent i
rejects agent j's oer, then agent i becomes the proposer after  > 0 units of time. The
extensive form of the bargaining game is given in Figure 1.
The bargaining game can terminate without an agreement because an agent voluntarily














Figure 1. This depicts the bargaining game in any odd period where
agent 1 speaks rst. He can oer y 2 [0;1] or opt-out. Agent 2 speaks
second and can accept the oer, reject the oer or opt-out. The option
value for agent i of opting out and returning to the unmatched matched
population is equal to vi. The option value vi is determined endogenously
in equilibrium. In equilibrium, vi equals the maximum of the agent's equi-
librium payo from remaining unmatched in the market and the agent's
payo from exiting the market and receiving x().
an agreement, then both agents return to the unmatched population. An agent in the
unmatched population can choose to wait for t() units of time (or t()= periods) for
a new bargaining partner,5 or can choose to leave the market and receive an exogenous
outside option worth x(). We assume that t : R+ ! R+ is a continuous function,
t()   for all  and lim!0 t() = 0. Also, we assume that x : R+ ! R+ is a
continuous function and lim!0 x()= = 0.
The period length  measures the amount of time it takes to formulate a counter-oer.
So, it is a measure of with-in bargaining frictions. If   0, then agents are able to make
oers almost instantaneously. The parameter t() measures the amount of time it takes
to generate a new bargaining opportunity and is a proxy for the magnitude of search
frictions. If t()  0, then agents are able to generate new bargaining partners almost
instantaneously.6 The parameter x() is the exogenous outside option. The only role
of the outside option is to ensure that agents who never trade leave the market instead
5Alternatively, one could assume, without introducing any additional complications, that matches are
determined by a Poisson process with an expected time to matching equal to t().
6We parametrize t() and x() by the period length  for a more unied exposition. All our results
would continue to hold even if we assume that these parameters are independent of the period length
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of accumulating and clogging up the market. The assumption that lim!0 x()= = 0
focuses our analysis away from x() and on endogenous outside options, even at the
limit.7
2.1. Agent types. Player i (a normal type belonging to class i) is impatient with in-
stantaneous rate of time preference ri. Consequently, if player i reaches an agreement
that gives him y units of surplus in period s, then his utility is equal to ye ris. Alter-
natively, if he takes the exogenous outside option in period s, then his utility is equal to
x()e ris.
Commitment type i (a commitment type belonging to class i) is assumed to insist on
share i of the unit surplus and reject any oer that gives him less than i. The demands
of commitment type 1 and commitment type 2 are incompatible, that is 1 + 2 > 1.
The commitment types never opt-out as long as there is positive probability that their
opponent is a normal type, and they immediately opt-out otherwise. Consequently, the
probability that two commitment types remain in a bargaining relationship forever is
zero. The commitment types decide whether to leave or remain in the market using the
same payo calculation as the normal types.8
2.2. The pool of unmatched agents and matching. Let Ns
i and Cs
i denote the
measure of unmatched player is and unmatched commitment type is in the matching











i are the proportions of player is and commitment type is among unmatched





i )g. If the
measure of agent 1s in the pool of unmatched agents is equal to the measure of agent
2s, then the market tightness parameter ms
1 = ms
2 = 1. Otherwise, since one side of the
market is larger, these agents are rationed and the market tightness for this side is less
than one. The market tightness is the inverse of the \queue length".
The pool of unmatched agents available to be matched in period s is comprised of
agents that entered the market in period s; agents whose bargaining arrangement dis-
solved as a result of an opt-out in period s t()=; and agents who in period s t()=
were not paired with a bargaining partner and who chose to remain in the market. An
7The assumption lim!0 x()= = 0 is immaterial for all of our results except Theorem 2 which requires
the weaker assumption that lim!0 x()=1   e t() = 0. However, we make the stronger assumption
in order to stress that the only role we wish x() to play is to ensure that the measure of active agents
remains bounded in equilibrium.
8This is a much stronger assumption than we need on the preferences of the commitment types. All
the results go through under the following behavioral assumption: if the probability of being traded is
strictly positive and if the expected time at which a trade occurs is nite, then there exists an x such
that the commitment types strictly prefer to remain in the market for all x() < x.BARGAINING AND REPUTATION 9
agent i is matched with a player j with probability ns
j and with a commitment type j
with probability cs






2 of player 1,




















of commitment type 1, commitment type 2 pairs are created, in each period s.
2.3. Histories and strategies. Agents have perfect recall. Agents do not observe the
actions chosen by another agent unless they are in a bargaining relationship. Agents
observe the actions of their bargaining partner while they bargain. Let ht denote a
period t history for agent i which contains all the information that agent i has observed
up to period t and let H denote the set of all histories for player i.
A strategy for player i, i : H ! [0;1][faccept; reject; opt out; leave; stayg. The
strategy for player i, i(ht) 2 [0;1] [ fopt   outg, if player i is making an oer in any
period t history ht and i(ht) 2 faccept; reject; opt   outg, if player i is responding in
any period t history ht. Also, at the end of each period, agents in the pool of unmatched
agents can leave the market and take their exogenous outside option, or choose to stay in
the market until the next period. Consequently, at a history ht where player i needs to
choose whether to leave or stay, i(ht) 2 fleave; stayg. A behavior strategy is similarly
dened but has the player randomizing over the action choices. We assume that agents of
the same type and class use the same strategy, i.e., we focus on symmetric strategies. A
belief for agent i is a function j : H ! [0;1] that gives the probability that agent i places
on his bargaining partner j being the commitment type, when player i is bargaining with
agent j.9





2) = (N1;C1;N2;C2) for all periods s. A steady state implies that the
measure of agents leaving the market in each period (through successfully consummat-
ing a trade or through voluntary exit) equals the inow of new agents into the market.
Consequently, the steady state equations for the market are as follows:
(1) (1   z1)L1 | {z }
Flow entry by player 1
= N1m1n2pnn | {z }
Trade with player 2
+ N1m1c2pnc | {z }






9At histories where player i is not bargaining with another agent, we set the belief function to equal the
steady state frequency of commitment type j, i.e., j = cj.10 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
and similarly
z1L1 = C1m1(n2pcn + c2pcc) + E
c
1; (2)
(1   z2)L2 = n2m2(N1pnn + C1pcn) + E
n
2; (3)
z2L2 = c2m2(N1pnc + C1pcc) + E
c
2; (4)
where pnn is the probability that player 1 and player 2 trade if matched, pcn is the
probability that commitment type 1 and player 2 trade if matched and pnc and pcc are
similarly dened. En
i and Ec
i are the measures of player is and commitment type is
leaving the market without trading at the end of each period, respectively. The vector of
match probabilities p, as well as, the vector of outows E are obtained from the strategy
proles.
2.5. Equilibrium. Let v = (v1;v2), c = (c1;c2), L = (L1;L2) and z = (z1;z2).  (;c;v)
denotes the bargaining stage game where the time between oers is , opting out is worth
vi to player i, and the initial belief that player i's opponent is a commitment type, i(h0)
is equal to ci. In the bargaining stage game  (;c;v), let Ui(jn) and Ui(jc) denote the
payo for player i conditional on facing a normal type or a commitment type respectively
and let Ui() = (1 cj)Ui(jn)+cjUi(jc) denote the expected payo for player i, if the
agents use strategy prole .
E(;L;z) denotes the search market. A search equilibrium  for E(;L;z) is com-
prised of a strategy k for each agent type; a belief function k for each agent type; and
steady state measures (N1;C1;N2;C2), that are mutually compatible. More precisely, an
equilibrium  satises the following conditions:
(i) The strategy prole  and the belief prole  comprises a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium (PBE) in the bargaining stage-game  (;c;v()), where ci = Ci=(Ni +Ci)
is the equilibrium frequency of commitment type i and vi() is the equilibrium
value for player i.
(ii) The equilibrium values for each player i satises the following recursive equation
vi() = maxfx();e
 rit()miUi() + (1   mi)e
 rit()vi():g
In words, player i can take the exogenous outside option, or alternatively wait
t() units of time and start a bargaining game  (;c;v()) with probability
mi = minf1;(Nj + Cj)=(Ni + Ci)g.
(iii) The market remains in steady state, i.e., equations (1) - (4) are satised, given
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2.6. Balanced and unbalanced markets. Recall we assume, without loss of gener-
ality, that L2  L1. First, as a baseline, assume that z1 = z2 = 0, i.e., assume that
there are no commitment types in the market. We say that the market is unbalanced if
L1 < L2 and we say that the market is balanced if L1 = L2.
The market with commitment types (z1 > 0 and z2 > 0) is a perturbation of the
baseline without commitment types. If we start from an unbalanced market without
any commitment types and perturb the model by assuming that a positive but small
percentage of the entering population is comprised of commitment types, then L1 <
L2(1   z2). Consequently, in the general model with commitment types we say that a
market is unbalanced if L1 < L2(1   z2). Similarly, if we start from a balanced market
without any commitment types and perturb the model by assuming that a positive but
small percentage of the entering population is comprised of commitment types, then
L1  L2(1 z2). Consequently, in the general model with commitment types we say that
a market is balanced if L1  L2(1   z2).
3. Baseline without commitment types
First, before turning to the model with commitment types, we study a model with
only rational agents (z1 = z2 = 0). In the bargaining stage game equilibrium play
unfolds according to the complete information alternating oers bargaining model of
Rubinstein (1982). Recall that   t(), that is, once in a bargaining relationship it
takes less time to make a counter oer than to opt-out and search for a new bargaining
partner. This implies, with only rational agents, players never opt-out after any history.
So, play is identical to an alternating oers bargaining game without opt-outs which







In each period, an equal number of agents from class i and j leave the market as a
result of successful trades. This is because all trade occurs in pairs. If the market is
unbalanced (L2 > L1), then there are more agent 2s entering the market than agent 1s
in each period and some agent 2s must leave the market voluntarily without trading, for
the market to remain in steady state. So, in order to incentivize agents on the long side
to voluntarily exit the market, equilibrium values for agent 2 must equal the exogenous
outside option x(), i.e., v2 = x(). However, since each agent 2 receives a substantial
portion of the unit pie in the bargaining stage game, the market tightness m2 for side
2 must be suciently smaller than 1, (or in alternative terminology, the queue length,
1=m2, must be suciently long) in order for agent i's value to equal x(). Alternatively,
if the markets are balanced (L2 = L1), then there is an equilibrium, with no queues12 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
on either side, in which case each side receives their Rubinstein payo. The following
summarizes these results.
The Complete Information Benchmark. If z1 = z2 = 0 and x() < mini e rit()u
i(),
then
(i) The agents receive their Rubinstein payos in the bargaining stage game, i.e.,
Ui() = u
i(),
(ii) If L2 > L1, then v2() = x() and v1() = e r1t()u
1(),
(iii) If L2 = L1, then vi() = e rit()u
i() and x()  vj()  e rjt()u
j(),
in any search equilibrium  of E(;L;z). Also, if L1 = L2, then there is a search
equilibrium  of E(;L;z) such that v1() = e r1t()u
1() and v2() = e r2t()u
2().
Proof. Follows from Rubinstein (1982), Shaked and Sutton (1984) or Osborne and Ru-
binstein (1990). For an argument see Appendix A. 
4. The bargaining stage game
This section presents results for the bargaining stage game used in the analysis of the
full economy. Lemmata 1, 2 and 3 take as given the vector of outside options, v, and
the vector of commitment type probabilities c and characterize PBE for the bargaining
stage-game  (;c;v).
We say player i reveals rationality if i accepts any oer less than i in a period she
responds, or proposes something other than i in a period that she proposes. Let r =
maxfr1;r2g. For any y > 0 and m > 0 we say that player i's payo Ui is approximately
equal to y, Ui  y, and the error is o(m), if there exists a constant  > 0, that is
independent of , such that
y   (1   e
 r)
m  Ui  y + (1   e
 r)
m:
Also, if the error associated with a particular approximation is omitted, then this should
be understood to mean that m = 1 and so the error is o().
Lemma 1 considers a situation where player 1's outside option is incompatible with
commitment type 2 (v1 > 1   2), while player 2's outside option is compatible with
commitment type 1 (v2 < 1   1). In this situation, player 1 would rather take his
outside option v1 than trade with commitment type 2 who demands 2. So, mimicking
the commitment type does not improve player 2's bargaining share and can delay a
possible agreement. This implies that player 2 will reveal rationality immediately. If
player 1 prefers his Rubinstein share u
1() to 1, then he does not have an incentive
to build a reputation either and the players will agree on their Rubinstein shares in theBARGAINING AND REPUTATION 13
rst period. If on the other hand u
1() < 1, that is, if player 1 has an incentive to
build a reputation, then player 1 will propose 1 in each period. Once player 2 reveals
her rationality, the continuation bargaining game is a game with one-sided incomplete
information and in this continuation player 1 can secure a payo close to 1, if  is
suciently small (Myerson (1991)). The conguration of outside options considered in
Lemma 1 has not been analyzed in previous literature. We provide the complete proof
in Appendix C. Also, we provide an analysis of the bargaining game with one-sided
incomplete information in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 (One-sided reputation). Suppose that c1 > 0, c2 > 0, 1 > v1, player 1's
outside option is incompatible with 1 2 and player 2's outside option is compatible
with 1   1, i.e., v1 > 1   2 and v2 < 1   1. If 1 > u
1(), then
(i) Player 1 always proposes 1,
(ii) Player 2 reveals rationality in period 1 or period 2,
(iii) U1(jn)  1 and U2(jn)  1   1;
if 1 < u
1(), then U1(jn) = u
1() and U2(jn) = u
2(); in any PBE  of  (;c;v).
Lemma 2 considers a situation where both outside options are dominated by the com-
mitment type demands. In this case both players would rather trade with a commitment
type than take the outside option. This game is identical to the bargaining game analyzed





(1   e rj)(1   i)




(i + j   1)
; (5)
Ti   lnci=i (6)
T = Ti minfTj=Ti;1g and (7)
bi  cic
 i=j
j for Ti > Tj: (8)
Abreu and Gul (2000) showed that all PBE of the bargaining game converge to a war
of attrition where each agent reveals their rationality with constant hazard rate i, both
agents complete their revealing at time T, and the \weaker" agent, i.e, the agent i with
the larger Ti, will concede with positive probability equal to 1   bi at time zero. In the
war of attrition, both players are indierent between revealing rationality immediately to
their opponent or continuing to resist, after time zero. This implies that the payo to the
normal type is equal to 1 j which is the payo obtained by yielding immediately to the
commitment type after time zero. Consequently, the bargaining game payo of the strong
player j is approximately (1 bi)j+bi(1 i). Also, the probability that the strong player
j concedes at time zero is equal to zero, i.e., 1   bj = 0. Consequently, the bargaining14 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
game payo of the weak player i is approximately equal to (1 bj)i+bj(1 j) = 1 j.
These ndings are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Two-sided reputation). Suppose that c1 > 0, c2 > 0. If both player 1
and player 2's outside options are compatible with 1   2 and 1   1 respectively, i.e.,
v1 < 1 2 and v2 < 1 1, then Ui()  (1 bj)i +bj(1 j) with error o(
p
) in any
PBE  of  (;c;v).
Proof. See Compte and Jehiel (2002) Proposition 3 or Abreu and Gul (2000) Proposition
4. 
Lemma 3 considers a situation where each player's outside option exceeds the payo
from trading with a commitment type. Under this scenario, the incentive to mimic the
commitment type is eliminated for both players since their opponent never accepts the
demand of a commitment type. However, once both players reveal rationality, the unique
PBE of the bargaining game results in the Rubinstein outcome. This result, established
in Compte and Jehiel (2002), is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that c1 > 0, c2 > 0, v1 < u
1() and v2 < u
2(). If both player
1 and player 2's outside options are incompatible with 1   2 and 1   1 respectively,
i.e., v1 > 1   2 and v2 > 1   1, then the players receive their Rubinstein payos, i.e.,
U1(jn) = u
1() and U2(jn) = u
2(), in any PBE  of  (;c;v)
Proof. See Compte and Jehiel (2002) Proposition 5. 
5. Unbalanced markets and one-sided reputation
In this section we focus on unbalanced markets (L1 < (1   z2)L2), i.e., markets where
there are more player 2s than agent 1s entering the market looking for a trade. We present
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Theorem 1 shows that equilibrium play is characterized by
one-sided reputation building in an unbalanced market. Corollary 1 generalizes this
result to an unbalanced market with multiple commitment types. For all our results we
assume that the time between oers, , is small.
First we prove an intermediate result, Lemma 4, which shows that player 1 receives
at least 1 in the bargaining game, player 1's equilibrium value, v1, is at least e r1t()1
and player 2's equilibrium value v2 is equal to x() in any search equilibrium. The
argument for v2 = x() is straightforward: a fraction of the player 2s must leave the
market without trading by taking their exogenous outside option in order for the market
to remain in steady state. Consequently, player 2 must be indierent between leaving the
market, which delivers a payo equal to x(), and remaining active in the market. InBARGAINING AND REPUTATION 15
equilibrium, the market tightness m2 is suciently smaller than 1 and ensures that player
2's value is equal to x(). In particular, as x() approaches zero, m2 also approaches
zero and the measure of class 2 agents in the market grows arbitrarily large.
The argument to show that player 1 receives at least 1 in the bargaining game is
more subtle: if x() is suciently small, then v2 = x() < 1 1, i.e., player 2's outside
option is compatible with 1   1. Also, we show that c2=c1 is small, if the exogenous
outside option x is suciently small. However, if v2 < 1   1 and if c2=c1 is suciently
small, then player 1's bargaining game payo is at least 1 (Lemma D.1 in the appendix).
The key step in this argument is to show that c2=c1 is small, that is, commitment type
2s are under-represented in the market compared to commitment type 1s. Roughly the
intuition is as follows: commitment type 1 does well in equilibrium since player 2 is
willing to trade with him. Consequently, commitment type 1 will not leave the market
without trading, if x() is suciently small. Commitment type 2, in contrast, always
voluntarily leaves after one period in the market. This is because commitment type 2
is strictly worse o than player 2 and player 2's payo is equal to x(). Hence the
measure of commitment type 2s in the market is equal to z2L2. However, there must be
an arbitrarily large measure of player 2s in the market in order for the market tightness
parameter m2 to be suciently small. Consequently, c2 and also c2=c1 are arbitrarily
small, if x() is suciently small.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the market is unbalanced. In any search equilibrium v2() =
x(). Moreover, for any  > 0, there is a positive cuto   such that if  <  , then
(i) Payos in the bargaining game are U1()  1    and U2()  1   1 + ,
(ii) Consequently, player 1's value is v1()  e r1t()(1   ),
in any search equilibrium  of E(;L;z).
The conclusions of Lemma 4 require that both  and x() are small. If t() is
also suciently small, then we can further characterize equilibrium behavior. Lemma
4 demonstrated that v1()  e r1t()(1   ). If t() and  are suciently small, then
agent 1's equilibrium value dominates conceding to his opponent's commitment type,
v1()  e r1t()(1 ) > 1 2, in any equilibrium (recall that 1+2 > 1). Consequently,
player 2's outside option, v2() = x, is compatible with 1   1, but player 1's outside
option is incompatible with 1   2. Hence, the bargaining stage-game involves one-
sided reputation building as in Lemma 1, if 1 > u
1(). In particular, player 2 reveals
rationality immediately whereas player 1 always proposes 1 and builds a reputation.
Following this line of reasoning, the following theorem characterizes equilibrium behavior
in an unbalanced market.16 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
Theorem 1. Suppose that the market is unbalanced. There is a cuto   such that if
 <   and 1 > u
1(), then
(i) Player 1 always proposes 1,
(ii) Player 2 reveals rationality in period 1 or period 2,
(iii) U1(jn)  1 and U2(jn)  1   1;
and if 1 < u
1(), then U1(jn) = u
1() and U2(jn) = u
2(); in the bargaining stage
of any search equilibrium  of E(;L;z).
The equilibrium behavior with commitment types (as characterized in Theorem 1)
contrasts with equilibrium behavior without any commitment types (as characterized in
section 3). In every equilibrium player 1 fully mimics the commitment type and insists
on 1. This is because player 2 is always willing to trade with commitment type 1.
More subtly, the equilibrium bargaining behavior does not involve two-sided reputation
building (as in Lemma 2), even though there are commitment types on both sides of the
market. Player 1's equilibrium payo, and thus his endogenous outside option, strictly
exceeds accepting the inexible demand of commitment type 2. As in Lemma 1 this
precludes player 2 from building a reputation. In particular the theorem shows,
(i) Player 1's equilibrium value, which is approximately e r1t()1, strictly exceeds
his equilibrium payo without commitment types e r1t()u
1(), and also the com-
mitment type demand 1 2. This implies that only player 1 builds a reputation.
(ii) Since the market tilts the bargaining power in the bargaining stage game towards
player 1, the queue length required to make player 2 willing to take the exogenous
outside option is reduced. Consequently, the overall eciency in the market is
improved compared to the complete information benchmark. Viewed from an
alternative angle, player 1's equilibrium value increases to 1 while player 2's
equilibrium value, which equals x(), remains unchanged. This implies that
overall eciency is improved. Notice that a greedier commitment type, i.e., a
higher 1, results in a greater eciency gain.
(iii) The ineciency in the bargaining stage is minimal. On the equilibrium path
player 2 immediately reveals rationality and the number of periods of delay, in a
game with one-sided incomplete information, is at most .
Theorem 1 considers a market with only one commitment type on each side. Suppose
instead an agent i is one of nitely many commitment types in a set Ti. Let n
i denote
the inexible demand of type n 2 f1;:::;jTijg of class i; let zn
i denote the fraction of class
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in each period. Let  i = maxfn
i 2Tigfn
i g and i = minfn
i 2Tigfn
i g. We assume that
1 + 2 > 1, that is, the demands of no two commitment types are compatible. The
following corollary shows that player 1 will mimic his most greedy commitment type
and will receive a payo arbitrarily close to the inexible demand of his most greedy
commitment type in any equilibrium.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the market is unbalanced. There is a positive cuto   such
that if  <   and  1 > u
1(), then v2() = x(), v1() > 1   2 and
(i) In the bargaining stage-game player 1 always proposes  1,
(ii) Player 2 reveals rationality in period 1 or period 2,
(iii) Payos in the bargaining game are U1(jn)   1 and U2(jn)  1    1,
and if  1 < u
1(), then U1(jn) = u
1() and U2(jn) = u
2(); in any search equilibrium
 of E(;L;z).
6. Balanced markets and two-sided reputation
In this section we switch our focus to balanced markets (L1 > L2(1 z2)) and we present
Theorem 2, Corollary 2, Theorem 3 and Corollary 3. Theorem 2 shows that the outside
options of all normal types are compatible with the demands of the commitment types
in any search equilibrium, Corollary 2 generalizes this result to markets with multiple
commitment types, and Theorem 3 describes a particular search equilibrium. In the
equilibrium that we present in Theorem 3, player 1 and player 2 play a war of attrition,
there are substantial delays in reaching an agreement, and agents opt-out from bargaining
relationships on the equilibrium path. In this equilibrium, ineciencies and delays remain
substantial, even at the limit of complete rationality (Corollary 3).
Recall that in an unbalanced market the equilibrium values for the long-side of the
market are determined by market forces. More precisely, for a steady state to exist a
portion of the long-side must voluntarily leave the market and so must receive value no
more than x(). In a balanced market on the other hand, ow demand and supply are
possibly equal and may place no restrictions on the equilibrium values of agents. Con-
sequently, a balanced market leaves room for a richer set of outcomes in the bargaining
stage.
We say that a market is generic, if the entering measure of normal types on the two
sides are unequal, i.e., if (1   z1)L1 6= (1   z2)L2. In a generic and balanced market, the
endogenous outside option of both normal types must be compatible with the demands
of the commitment types (Theorem 2). The intuition for the result is as follows: Suppose
that neither normal type trades with a commitment type. This assumption implies that
vi  1   j > x() for i 2 f1;2g. Because vi > x() for i 2 f1;2g, neither normal type18 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
leaves the market without trading. However, the assumption that normal types only
trade with each other and the genericity assumption (L1(1   z1) 6= L2(1   z2)) makes a
steady state impossible. Consequently, vi  1   j for some i 2 f1;2g. Suppose that
player 1's value is strictly less than 1   2 and player 2's value is strictly greater than
1   1. In this case, player 1 trades with both player 2 and commitment type 2 with
certainty (see Lemma 1). However, player 2 only trades with player 1 because v2 > 1 1.
This implies that for x() suciently small, the values of both player 2 and commitment
type 2 are strictly greater than x(). Consequently, neither player 2 nor commitment
type 2 will leave the market without trading. Also, all commitment type 1s receive value
equal to zero in equilibrium and so leave the market voluntarily without trading. This
implies that a ow of (1 z1)L1 must accommodate the trades of a ow of L2. However,
this is not possible since L2  L1 by assumption. A more subtle argument is needed to
show that the values cannot satisfy vi > 1   j and vj = 1   i. We defer this argument
to the appendix.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the market is generic and balanced. There is a positive cuto
  such that if  <  , then v1()  1   2 and v2()  1   1 in any search equilibrium
 of E(;L;z).
In Theorem 2 we restricted attention to the generic case where L1(1 z1) 6= L2(1 z2).
If L1(1 z1) = L2(1 z2), then an ecient equilibrium exists. In this ecient equilibrium
normal agents receive their Rubinstein payos and the commitment types are never
traded. However, the inecient equilibrium we present below in Theorem 3 remains an
equilibrium even when L1(1   z1) = L2(1   z2).10
Equilibria in a generic and balanced markets contrast both with equilibria in mar-
kets with complete information and equilibria in unbalanced markets (Theorem 1). In
particular,
(i) The inexible commitment type demands (1 and 2) determine upper bounds
on equilibrium values, i.e., v1  1   2 and v2  1   1. This implies that
v1=e r1t() + v2=e r2t() < 1 for t() close to zero. Consequently, in a balanced
market all equilibria entail signicant ineciency. In contrast, in a market with
complete information there is an ecient equilibrium where the players receive
the Rubinstein payos.
(ii) The inexible commitment type demands determine a lower bound on the mag-
nitude of ineciency in the market. This lower bound is independent of the
entering proportion of commitment types. Hence ineciency remains substantial
10There are also other inecient equilibria when L1(1   z1) = L2(1   z2).BARGAINING AND REPUTATION 19
even in the limiting case of complete rationality (i.e., for any small z1 and z2).
This contrasts with models of two-sided incomplete information, such as Abreu
and Gul (2000) or Compte and Jehiel (2002), where eciency is restored in the
limiting case of complete rationality.
In Corollary 2 we provide conditions under which the ndings of Theorem 2 extend
to markets with multiple commitment types. Suppose that the commitment types are
ordered according to increasing greediness, i.e, if n < k, then n
i < k
i . Suppose that
z2 < z1 and let 1 denote the smallest index such that 1 z1 +
P1
n=1 zn
1 = 1 z2, if such
a type exists. If such a type does not exist, then let 1 = 0. Note that 1 is the least
greedy commitment type that equates ow entry by each side of the market.
In the rst part of Corollary 2, we assume that the type space is suciently rich and
1 > 0. Consequently, the total ow by commitment type 1s who are less greedy than
1 plus player 1s (1   z1 +
P1
n=1 zn
1) equals the entry ow of player 2s (1   z2). Under
this assumption we show that an equilibrium exists where behavior is governed by one-
sided reputation building in the bargaining stage and hence eciency is restored. This
market exhibits dynamics similar to the unbalanced market as characterized by Theorem
1. We refer to this as the case of a \ne type space" since, had the type distributions
over commitment types been atomless with support [1;  1], then this condition would be
automatically satised.
The second part of the corollary deals with the case of a coarse type space, that is, at
least one commitment type is required on each side to equate the ow entry of the two
sides (1 = 0). In this case, the corollary shows that the ndings of Theorem 2 remains
valid, and the two normal types are compatible with the demands of the least greedy
commitment types.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the market is generic and balanced.




1(). There is a cuto   > 0 such that if  <  , then there exists a search
equilibrium  of E(;L;z) such that
(a) v2()  1   
1
1 ,
(b) In the bargaining stage-game player 1 always proposes 
1
1 ,
(c) Player 2 reveals rationality in period 1 or period 2,
(d) Payos in the bargaining game are U1()  
1
1 and U2()  1   
1
1 , and
player 1's value is v1()  e r1t()
1
1 .
(ii) Coarse type space and two-sided reputation. Assume that 1 = 0. If
 <  , then v1()  1   2 and v2()  1   1 in any search equilibrium  of
E(;L;z).20 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
6.1. An inecient equilibrium. As demonstrated in Theorem 2, all search equilibria
involve substantial ineciency (v1  1 2 and v2  1 1). Ineciency can stem from
a small market tightness parameter (i.e., a large queue length) for one side of the market.
Alternatively, the market may be inecient because it takes substantial time for player
1 and 2 to reach an agreement when they bargain (i.e., because of delays in bargaining).
In what follows, we assume that L1 = L2 and we focus on the case where  and
t() are arbitrarily small. In Theorem 3, we construct an equilibrium where the market
tightness parameter is equal to one. Hence, ineciency does not stem from long queue
lengths in this equilibrium. If the market tightness parameter is equal to one, then as
t() becomes small, the search market becomes frictionless for any agent: An agent can
ensure nding a bargaining partner from the opposite side arbitrarily fast. Consequently,
in this market all ineciency is a result of informational asymmetries that lead to delays
in bargaining.
In the equilibrium that we present in Theorem 3, both players build a reputation on
the equilibrium path and there are delays resulting from a war of attrition a-la Abreu
and Gul (2000). In this equilibrium, player 1 and player 2 always trade, player 2 always
trades with commitment type 1, but player 1 opts out with positive probability against
commitment type 2. In order for a simpler exposition, we describe the equilibrium at
the limit where there are no frictions, i.e.,  = t() = x() = 0. In particular, we
present the equilibrium using a continuous time war of attrition. The assumption  = 0
is inessential and is used solely to simplify exposition. In Appendix F, we validate our use
of continuous time by establishing that there exists a sequence of equilibria for games
where t()   > 0 (Theorem F.1) and also that these equilibria converge to the
continuous time characterization we discuss here, as  ! 0 and t() ! 0 (Theorem
F.2).
6.1.1. The bargaining stage game as a continuous time war of attrition with opt-out. In
the continuous time war of attrition each player chooses to yield, insist or opt-out at
each time t. So, a pure strategy for each player can be represented as a choice of a real
time t 2 [0;1] and action a 2 fY ield; Opt   outg. If the player chooses t = 1 this
represents that the player never yields or opts out. The commitment type's (inexible)
strategy is to never yield to an opponent.
If player i yields at time t before player j yields or opts out, then player i and player
j receive (1   j)e rit and je rjt, respectively. If both players yield at the same time t,
then player i and player j receive e rit(
i+1 j
2 ) and e rjt(
j+1 i
2 ), respectively. If player
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i and player j receive (1   j)e rit and je rjt, respectively. If player i opts out at time
t before player j yields, then the players receive their outside options v1 and v2.
A mixed strategy for player i in the bargaining game can be summarized by two
cumulative distribution functions Fi and i such Fi(1) + i(1)  1 where Fi(t) is the
total probability with which player i and the commitment type i yield at or before time
t, and i(t) is the probability with which player i and the commitment type i opt-out at
or before time t.
6.1.2. Equilibrium with selective break-ups. We term a search equilibrium \an equilib-
rium with selective break ups" (SBU equilibrium) for the limit market E(0;L;z)
where  = t() = x() = 0 if
(i) Values v1 = 1   2 and v2 = 1   1,
(ii) If i(t) > 0 for some t  0, then j(t) = 0 for all t,
(iii) If i(t) > 0 for some t  0, then Fi(t) = Fi(t0) for any t0 > t.
Condition (i) and condition (ii) are satised by any search equilibrium asymptotically
as  ! 0 and t() ! 0. Condition (iii) ensures tractable dynamics that are directly
comparable to previous work (Abreu and Gul (2000) and Compte and Jehiel (2002)).
We discuss the dynamics of the equilibrium in detail below.
Condition (i) states that the players are indierent between yielding and opting out
in the bargaining stage. Notice, Theorem 2 implies that vi  1   j for both players in
any search equilibrium. Also, a player can guarantee 1   j in the bargaining game by
yielding immediately to his/her opponent. Thus vi  e t()ri(1   j) for both players
and moreover if t() = 0, then vi  1   j. So, condition (i) is satised asymptotically
as  ! 0 and t() ! 0.
Condition (ii) states that at most one of the two players opts out in the bargaining
stage. This condition is satised in any search equilibrium when  is positive but su-
ciently small. This is because at least one of the two players is weaker in the bargaining
stage and is willing to yield to the commitment type. For this player, yielding strictly
dominates opting out and waiting for t() periods for another bargaining partner. For
further detail see the development in Theorem F.1 and Theorem F.2.
Condition (iii) requires that if player i opts out with positive probability at some time
t, then he does not yield at any time after t, including t. This condition ensures that
both players yield according to an atomless density as in Abreu and Gul (2000).
As an initial step in describing a SBU equilibrium, we consider a bargaining game where
opting out is not allowed. Let ^ c = (^ c1;^ c2) denote the commitment type probabilities, if
both player 1 and player 2 trade with commitment type 1 and 2 with probability 1 (i.e.,
if pcn = pnc = 1). More precisely, ^ c1 = z1=(1   z2) and ^ c2 = z2=(1   z1). Let ^  (0;c)22 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
denote the bargaining game where opting out is not allowed. In this game, equilibrium
play follows Lemma 2: At time zero, the weaker player yields with an atom and after
time zero the two players yield to each other continuously at constant hazard rates 1
and 2. Recall i = rj(1   i)=(i + j   1) and if ln(^ c2=2) > ln(^ c1=1), then player 1 is
strictly weaker than player 2. Suppose that ln^ c2=2 > ln^ c1=1, that is, player 1 is the
strictly weaker player and yields with an atom at time zero in ^  (0;^ c).
We now describe the dynamics of an SBU equilibrium . Behavior in the SBU equi-
librium is identical to equilibrium play in ^  (0;^ c) except that neither player yields with
positive probability at time zero. Instead player 1 opts out after his opponent completes
her yielding. In particular, a SBU equilibrium satises the following:
(a) The players yield at constant rates 1 and 2, and neither player yields with positive
probability at time zero. Consequently, Fi(t) = 1   e it 8i 2 f1;2g:
(b) The players nish yielding concurrently at a common time T.
(c) Player 2 never opts out and trades with player 1 and commitment type 1 with
probability one, i.e., pnn = pcn = 1. Consequently, the following equation holds:
(9) 1   e
 2T = n2 = 1   c2:
This equation ensures that the total probability that agent 2 yields by time T equals the
total probability that agent 2 trades with a commitment type, i.e., the probability that
agent 2 is player 2. Also, the common time T =  lnc2=2 which we obtain by solving
equation (9) for T.
(d) The weaker player in the game ^  (0;^ c), player 1 in this case, yields at rate 1 until
time T and then opts out. Consequently, the following equation holds:
(10) 1   e
 1T = pnc(1   c1):
This equation ensures that the total probability that agent 1 yields by time T equals
the total probability that agent 1 trades with commitment type 2, i.e., the probability
that agent 1 is player 1 and trades with commitment type 2. Also, the probability that
player 1 trades with the commitment type 2, pnc, is equal to (1   e 1T)=(1   c1) which
we obtain by solving equation (10) for pnc.
(e) The steady state frequencies c1 and c2 are determined by the steady state equations
and the trade probabilities pnn = pcn = 1 and pnc  1. Given these match probabilities,







z2 + (1   z1   z2)pnc
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The following theorem shows that a SBU equilibrium exists and is unique, if the
entering fraction of commitment types are suciently small. Let
(13) z
 = minf1;2g=(1 + 2):
Theorem 3. Suppose that L1 = L2. If z1 < z and z2 < z, then there exists a unique
SBU equilibrium for E(0;L;z).
6.2. The limiting case of complete rationality. We now turn to characterizing the
limit outcome for the market as the entering measure of commitment types, z1L1+z2L2,
converges to zero. Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 only require that there is a strictly positive
measure of commitment types entering the market. Hence the conclusion of Theorem
2 holds, i.e., v1  1   2 and v2  1   1, and the conclusion of Theorem 3 holds, i.e.,
a unique SBU equilibrium exists, even as the entering measure of commitment types
converges to zero.
Corollary 3 below further shows that the probability that player 1 trades with commit-
ment type 2 goes to one and the steady state frequency of commitment types converges
to zero, in a SBU equilibrium as the entering measure of commitment types goes to zero.
Recall that the market tightness parameter is equal to one in any SBU equilibrium and
therefore nding a bargaining partner is asymptotically costless. Consequently, nding
a normal type as a bargaining partner is asymptotically costless in a SBU equilibrium.
However, even though the market is (asymptotically) frictionless and free of commitment
types ineciency in the bargaining game remains substantial (v1  1 2 and v2  1 1).
Hence, Corollary 3 leads us to conclude that access to the market exacerbates bargaining
ineciencies caused by irrational types, instead of forcing outcomes closer to eciency,
even as we approach the frictionless limit of complete rationality.
Corollary 3. Suppose that L1 = L2. Let k denote a SBU equilibrium for E(0;L;zk)
and let ck denote the steady state frequency of commitment types in search equilibrium k.




nc = 1 and the steady state frequency of commitment types converges to zero,
i.e., limn ck
1 = limn ck
2 = 0.
Corollary 3 stands in sharp contrast to previous literature. Abreu and Gul (2000)
show that one of the two players is asymptotically strictly stronger and if player i is
asymptotically strictly stronger, then the two players trade immediately without any
delay, the equilibrium payo of the stronger side is i and the equilibrium payo of the24 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
weaker player is 1   i, at the limit.11 Hence, ineciency disappears but incomplete
information still has an impact on the division of the surplus, at the limit. In an SBU
equilibrium, in contrast, ineciency remains substantial even at the limit.
In an SBU equilibrium, the probability that player 1 opts out against commitment
type 2, i.e., 1 pnc, equates the strength of player 1 and player 2 in the bargaining stage
and thereby ensures that neither player yields with an atom at the start of bargaining.
Notice that pnc cannot converge to zero, as z1 and z2 converge to zero. This is because if
pnc were to converge to zero, then player 1 and player 2 would not be equally strong in
the bargaining stage. As z1 and z2 converge to zero, c2 goes to zero and the common time
that the two players complete yielding goes to innity. This follows from equations (9)
and (11) and the fact that pnc does not go to zero. Consequently, as z1 and z2 converge
to zero, the \amount" of opt-out required to equate the bargaining strength of the two
player becomes arbitrarily small, i.e., pnc converges to one.
11In particular, if 1 < 2 and if the commitment type probabilities approach to zero at the same rate,
then player 2 is the stronger player, asymptotically. If the commitment type probabilities converge at
dierent rates, then generically one of the two players is strictly stronger, asymptotically.BARGAINING AND REPUTATION 25
Appendix A. Proofs for Section 3
Proof of the Complete Information Benchmark. Let  u1 denote the best payo player
1 receives in the bargaining stage game in any equilibrium. Consequently, v1()   u1 in
any equilibrium . So, u2  1   e r1 u1. In any period where player 2 proposes she
can guarantee 1   e r1 u1. In other words, player 2's worst payo in a period she pro-
poses u2  1   e r1 u1. This is because in any period where player 1 responds he can
expect at most maxfe r1 u1;e r1t()v1()g by rejecting the oer or opting-out. However,
maxfe r1 u1;e r1t()v1()g = e r1 u1, because, v1()   u1 and e r1  e r1t().
Observe that  u1  1   e r2u2. This is because player 2 can always reject player 1's oer
and guarantee u2. Consequently, we have the following system of inequalities
 u1  1   e r2u2 (14)
u2  1   e r1 u1 (15)
 u2  1   e r1u1 (16)
u1  1   e r2 u2 (17)
Solving this system implies that U1() = u1 =  u1 = u
1() > v1() and U2() = u
2(), in any
equilibrium .
For item (ii) observe that in order for a steady state, some of the class i agents must leave
the market voluntarily and so vi() = x(). Also,
vi()=e rit() = miu
i() + (1   mi)vi()  miu
i():
Consequently, u
i() > x() implies that mi < 1 and mj = 1. So, vj()=e rjt() = u
j().
Item (iii): mi = 1 for at least one of the agents i. Consequently, vi()=e rit() = u
i() for
this i. If mi = 1, then mj  1. Consequently, vj()=e rjt()  u
j(). Also, it is easily veried
that m1 = m2 = 1 and vi()=e rit() = u
i() is an equilibrium. 
Appendix B. The bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information
In this section, we summarize various ndings by Myerson (1991), Abreu and Gul (2000),
and Compte and Jehiel (2002) for the bargaining stage-game  (;c;v), where c1 > 0, c2 = 0
and vi < 1  j. We assume that player 1 is potentially a commitment type, player 2 is known
to be rational with probability one, and both players' outside options are worse than yielding to
the commitment types. Our development closely follows Compte and Jehiel (2002) Appendix
A where all the stated results can be found.
Lemma B.1. Suppose that c1 > 0, c2 = 0, v1 < 1   2 and v2 < 1   1. Then U1()  1 and
U2()  1   1 in any PBE  of  (;c;v).26 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
Proof. See the development in Myerson (1991), Chapter 8, Theorem 8.4; or Abreu and Gul
(2000) Lemma 1; or Compte and Jehiel (2002), Proposition 2. 
Let i = e ri. Compte and Jehiel (2002), Appendix A, dene
vn = [1]2n+11 (18)
 =
1   [1]2
1   [2]2;0 = 1   0 and (19)
w0() = maxf(1   )(1   v0) + 2(1   1);1   1g (20)
0 : 2w0(0) = 1   1 if 2w0(0)  1   1, and 0 = 0 otherwise. (21)
Let N be the largest integer for which
[1]2N1 > u
2()
Consider the sequence fn;n;wn;wn(:)g0nN dened recursively by
n+1 =
wn
wn + vn; (22)
n+1 = kn+1(1   k); (23)
wn+1 = n+1(1 + (   1)vn); (24)
wn+1() = (1   =n)(1   vn+1) + (=n)[2]2wn: (25)
In this sequence, wn = wn(n) = wn 1(n). The following lemma shows that player 2's
equilibrium payo is a continuous and non-decreasing function of player 1's reputation level
. The strength of this lemma is that it shows player 2's equilibrium payo is independent of
which equilibrium is played and which history has been reached in the game. It is completely
determined by player 1's reputation level and by whether player 2 is a proposer or a responder.
Lemma B.2. Suppose that  > N. Let u2() be the function that coincides with wn() on
each interval (n+1;n], n 2 f0;::;N   1g.
(i) Player 1 proposes 1 in all odd periods,
(ii) In any even period, if player 1's reputation level  2 (n+1;n), then player 2 proposes
vn,
(iii) In any even period if player 1 is the commitment type with probability , then player
2's equilibrium payo is equal to u2() ,
(iv) In any odd period where player 1 has proposed 1, if player 1 is the commitment type
with probability , then player 2's equilibrium payo is equal to maxf1 1;e r2u2()g
in any PBE  of  (;c;v).
Proof. See Compte and Jehiel (2002), Proposition 10. 
Note that N ! 0 as  ! 0. The previous lemma also pins down player 1's payo at
all point in the game except the cut-o reputation level n. This is because player 2 alwaysBARGAINING AND REPUTATION 27
oers vn when  2 (n+1;n) and player 1 always randomizes between accepting and rejecting.
Consequently, in any even period where player 1's reputation is  2 (n+1;n), player 1's
equilibrium payo is vn. When  = n, player 2 may oer vn or vn 1. Compte and Jehiel
(2002) construct PBE where player 2 randomizes between vn and vn 1 if  = n. If  = n,
then for any q 2 [0;1] there is a PBE where player 2 oers vn with probability q and oers
vn 1 with probability 1   q. Therefore, if  = n, then player 1's equilibrium payo set is the
convex and closed interval [vn;vn 1].
Lemma B.3. There exists a PBE for the game  (;c;v). The equilibrium payo set for player
1, viewed as a (possibly multi-valued) function of  is an upper-hemi-continuous compact and
convex valued correspondence.
Proof. See the above discussion and Compte and Jehiel (2002), Proposition 11. 
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Step 1. There exists a period T such that in period T + 1 agent 2 is
known to be commitment type 2 with certainty and player 1 opts out with certainty by time
T + 1.
For player 1 to not opt-out or not reveal rationality for another K= periods, the probability
that player 2 concedes (i.e., reveals rationality by either oering something other than 1   2
to player 1, or by accepting 1   1) to player 1's demands, denoted p, must satisfy
1   2  p + (1   p)e r1K:
This is because player 1 can guarantee at least 1   2 < v1() today by opting out or by
revealing rationality. Also, player 1 can get at most one if player 2 concedes, and player 1 can
get at most one as a continuation payo after the K= periods. Choose K suciently large so
that 1   2 > e r1K. So,
1 > p >
1   2   e r1K
1   e r1K > 0:






(1 p)N > 1 and thus by period NK= a rational player 1 is sure that player 2 is
the commitment type in any equilibrium. Consequently, if T + 1 > NK=, then player 1 will
opt-out with probability 1.
Step 2. Appendix B implies the following: If in history ht player 2 has revealed rationality
by proposing something dierent than 2 and player 1 is the commitment type with probability
2(ht) > c1, then U1()  1 and U2()  1 1. Also, in any period where player 2 proposes,
player 2's payo is unique as a function of player 1's reputation level.
The steps that follow show that player 2 will either accept 1 in period one, or will reveal
rationality by proposing something other than 1   2 in period two.28 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
Step 3. If in an even period player 1 is known to be rational, then player 2 oers player 1
the Rubinstein payo e r1u
1(), and player 1 accepts.
If player 2 asks for something other than 2 and reveals rationality, then player 1 can reject
the oer and secure the Rubinstein payo u
1() in the next period. Consequently, in the event
that player 2 asks for something other than 2, then she will receive 1   e r1u
1().
Let  u denote the highest continuation payo for player 2 at the start of any period where
she proposes for any reputation level. If player 2 asks for 2, then player 1 will reject, because
his outside option is larger than 2. Also, in the next period where player 1 proposes he will
never oer anything above e r2 u. This is because player 1 will always opt-out against the
commitment type and player 2 will always accept e r2 u. So, player 2's best payo if she
proposes 2 is e r22 u. But this implies that  u  maxfe r22 u;(1   e r1)u
1()g and so
 u  (1 e r1)u
1(). Thus player 2 should reveal rationality and oer player 1 the Rubinstein
split.
Step 4. If player 1 oers something dierent than 1, then player 1 oers u
2().
If player 1 reveals rationality, then there will be an agreement in the next period and player
2 will receive 1   e r1u
1(). Consequently, player 2 will accept e r2(1   er1u
1) = u
2()
and no less than this. So player 1 will oer u
2() to player 2 and receive u
1() > e r1u
1()
for himself, if he is to reveal rationality by deviating from 1.
Step 5. Let S = supfs : 9hs s.t. zi(hs)  ci and Prfplayer 1 proposes u
2() in period sjhsg >
0g. By Step 1 S  T. Also, in period T, player 1 will only oer 1. This is because the normal
type of player 2 will always accept 1 in period T as player 1 will opt-out with certainty after
period T.
Step 6. In period S, if player 1 instead oers 1, then player 2's payo after this oer is
uniquely determined and is at least 1   1 and is at most 1   1 + (1   e r).
If player 2 reveals rationality, then her payo is uniquely determined as a function of player
1's reputation level, by Lemma B.2.
In the continuation game, player 2 either accepts 1 in period S or reveals rationality in
period S + 1. This is because player 1 only oers 1 and never accepts 2. Consequently, any
trade occurs through player 2 either accepting 1 or revealing rationality. However, player 1's
reputation never decreases in the continuation. Also, player 2's continuation payo, following
player 2's revelation of rationality, is uniquely determined and decreasing in player 1's reputation
level. So, player 2 does not gain from delaying revealing rationality after period S + 1. Once
player 2 reveals rationality in period S + 1, and player 1 can guarantee a continuation payo
equal to e r1(1   (1   e r)), by Lemma B.1. Hence, player 2's payo is at most 1   1 +
( + 1)(1   e r). Also, player 2 can guarantee 1   1 by simply accepting the oer in S.
Step 7. Player 1 prefers to oer 1 instead of u
2() in period S. Consequently, player 1
never oers anything but 1.
If player 1 oers u
2(), then the normal type player 2 will accept and if there is a rejection,
then player 1 will opt-out in period S + 1. If player 1 o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player 2 will either accept or reveal rationality in period S + 1. If player 2 does not reveal
rationality, then player 1 will opt-out in period S + 1. Consequently, player 1's payo against
the commitment type is identical regardless of whether he oers 1 or u
2(). Player 1's payo
once player 2 has revealed rationality is 1  (1 e r) by Lemma 1. So, if player 1 oers 1,
then her payo against player 2 is at least e r1(1   (1   e r) which exceeds u
1().
Step 8. Player 2 reveals rationality in period 2 (i.e., the rst period she proposes) or accepts
1 in period 1.
This is because player 1 always oers 1. Consequently, there is no incentive for player 2 to
delay revealing rationality. Since player 2 reveals either in the rst period or the second period,
player 1's payo is at least e r1(1   (1   e r)). 
Appendix D. Proofs of Lemma 4, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
Lemma D.1. Suppose that v2 < 1   1. For every  > 0 and  > 0, there exists   > 0 and
 c > 0 such that if  <  , c1 >  and c2 <  c, then U1()  1   ()(1   e r2)    in any
PBE  of  (;c;v).
Proof. Step 1. There exists a period T, that is independent of c2, such that if player 1 has not
revealed rationality by period T, then he is known to be the commitment type with probability 1.
Follows immediately from Appendix C, Step 1.
Step 2. Player 2 must reveal rationality by period T + 1.
If player 1 has not revealed rationality by time T, then player 2 knows that player 1 is the
commitment type with probability 1. So, player 2 will reveal rationality by period T + 1.
Step 3. Let pt denote the total probability that player 2 reveals rationality in period t by
either accepting or proposing something other than 2, after any history where 1(ht)  c1. By
the previous step and Bayes' rule
c2
QT+1
t=1 (1   pt)
= 1:
Step 4. For every , there exists a  c such that if c2 <  c, then p1 + p2  1   .
Suppose not. Then there exists a sequence ck
2 ! 0 and a  > 0 such that p1 + p2 < 1   .
This implies, by the previous step, that there exists 2 < m  T + 1 and a subsequence of
equilibria k such that pk
m ! 1. If player 2 reveals rationality, then player 1's payo is at
least 1   (1   e r), by Lemma B.1. Consequently, there exists an index K such that for
all equilibria k with k > K we have 1   2 < e r1pk
m(1   (1   e r)). This implies that
player 1 will not reveal rationality in period m 1 in any equilibrium k for all k > K. Player
2's payo at any even period, where player 2 is known to be rational with certainty, is a non-
increasing function of the reputation level 1 of player 1. This is also true for all odd periods. In
equilibrium k, 1(hm 2)  1(hm). Consequently, player 2's payo from revealing rationality
in period m 2 is strictly greater than player 2's payo from not revealing rationality and then
revealing rationality with probability pk
m in period m. However, this is a contradiction.30 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
The bound on player 1's equilibrium payo U1() follows from the fact that player 2 reveals
rationality in period 1 or period 2 with probability of at least 1   . 
Proof of Lemma 4. In the following development, we assume  is as small as we need and
consequently that x() is suciently small.
Step 1. In any search equilibrium v2() = x() and consequently m2 < 1 and m1 = 1.
In order for the steady state equations to hold some of the class 2 agents must be leaving the
market without trading. This implies that player 2's value v2() = x(). In the bargaining
stage game, player 2 can guarantee 1   1. So in any equilibrium v2()=e r2t()  m2(1  
1) + (1   m2)v2(). Consequently, x() = v2() 
e r2t()m2(1 1)
1 e r2t()(1 m2). This implies that m2 
x(1 e r2t())
(1 1)e r2t() e r2t()x(). Consequently, m2 is arbitrarily close to zero for x() small. However,
m2 < 1 implies that m1 = 1.
Step 2. In any search equilibrium C1  L1z1 and C2 = z2L2.
C1  L1z1 because L1z1 is the number of commitment type 1s that enter the market in each
period. Commitment type 2 does strictly worse than player 2. This is because player 2 can
do at least as well as the commitment type 2 against player 1 by using an identical strategy.
Also, player 2 can trade with commitment type 1 and obtain 1   1 in these meetings. If the
value of player 2 is less than or equal to x(), then the payo for commitment type 2 is strictly
less than x(). Consequently, all of these types, who are in the unmatched population at the
end of a period, will choose to voluntarily exit instead of waiting t()= periods for a possible
match. So C2 = z2L2.
Step 3. Take a sequence of k ! 0 and let k denote a search equilibrium for E(k;L;z).
For any sequence of search equilibria k, Nk
2 ! 1, nk
2 ! 1 and ck
2 ! 0. Also, there exists
 > 0 such that, for all k < ^ , ck
1  .
If  ! 0, then x() ! 0. If x() ! 0, then m2 
x()(1 e r2t())
e r2t()(1 1) e r2t()x() ! 0. Also
C1 + N1  L1 and C2 = z2L2 for any x(). Consequently, if x(k) ! 0, then mk
2 ! 0 and so
Nk
2 ! 1, nk
2 ! 1 and ck
2 ! 0.
We argue that pnn  1   1
1 x(). In the bargaining stage game player 1 does not opt-
out in the rst period. This is because if player 1 opts out in the rst period, then the
bargaining relationship is less valuable than being unmatched in the economy. This implies
that v1  e r1t()v1, which is not possible. Player 2 can guarantee 1   1 by immediately
oering 1 to player 1. The best that player 2 can hope for is to receive 1 if there is no break-up
and to receive x() if there is a break-up. Consequently,
1   1  Prfopgx() + 1   Prfopg
where Prfopg is the total probability of an opt-out. Hence, the total probability of an opt-out
is at most 1
1 x(). So, pnn > 1   1
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Notice that N1 
(1 z1)L1
pnnn2 and c1  z1L1
z1L1+N1. Substituting and using pnnn2 < 1 gives
c1 
z1L1pnnn2
z1L1pnnn2 + (1   z1)L1
 z1pnnn2:
For x() suciently small, n2 is close to 1 and 1   1
1 x() is close to 1 1. Consequently, for
any  < z1(1   1), we can choose ^  such that for all  < ^ , z1n2pnn >  > 0 and c1 >  > 0.
Consequently, by Step 3 and by Lemma D.1, there exists   < ^  such that U1() > 1   
for all k <   completing the argument. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Pick   small such that v1()  e r1t( )1 > 1   2. So, if  <  ,
then v1() > 1   2. However, if v1() > 1   2, v2() = x() < 1   1, then the conditions of
Lemma 1 are satised and the Lemma implies items (i) through (iii). 
Proof of Corollary 1. Let Ci =
P
n2Ti Cn
i likewise ci =
P
n2Ti cn
i . The following are imme-
diate consequences of Lemma 4: In any equilibrium v2() = x() and consequently m2 < 1
and m1 = 1. In any equilibrium Cn
1  L1z1 for any n 2 T1 and C2 = z2L2. Take a sequence
of k ! 0 and let k denote a search equilibrium. For any sequence of search equilibria k,
Nk
2 ! 1, nk
2 ! 1 and ck
2 ! 0. Also, there exists  > 0 such that, for all k <  , (cn
1)k   for
any n 2 T1.
We argue that if k <  , then v1(k) > 1   2 for any equilibrium k.
If U1() > (1 jT2j)( 1 (1 e r) ), then for x() suciently small v1()  n2U1() 
(1   jT2j)( 1   (1   e r)   ) since n2 can be made arbitrarily close to 1. Pick  such that
(1 jT2j)( 1  (1 e r) ) > 1 2. Let B  T2 denote the set of types for player 2 such
that for any n 2 B the probability that player 2 mimics type n is larger than , conditional
on player 1 mimicking  1 in period 1, in equilibrium . Suppose that the set B is non-empty.
In any subgame where player 1 chooses to mimic  1 in period 1 and player 2 chooses to mimic
n 2 B, Lemma D.1 implies that U1() > 1   (1   e r)    for all  <  .
Conditional on player 1 mimicking type  1 the probability that player 2 either mimics a type
in B or reveals rationality in period 1 or period 2 is at least (1  jT2j) by the denition of the
set B. If player 1 chooses  1 and player 2 reveals rationality then player 1's payo is at least
 1   (1   e r). Consequently, player 1 can secure payo of at least (1   jT2j)( 1   (1  
e r)   ) by mimicking  1.
If v1() > 1   2, v2() = x() < 1    1, then player 1 can always choose to mimic type
 1 by proposing  1 in period 1. In the continuation game all the conditions of Lemma 1 are
satised and the Lemma implies items (i) through (iii). 
Appendix E. Proofs of Theorem 2, Theorem 3, Corollary 2 and Corollary 3
Proof of Theorem 2. By the assumption of the theorem (1 z1)L1 6= (1 z2)L2. We further
assume in this proof (1   z1)L1 < (1   z2)L2. This further assumption is without loss of
generality.
Step 1. Player i trades with commitment type j, for some i, and so vi  1   j.32 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
Suppose not, i.e., pnc = pcn = 0. If pnc = pcn = 0, then vi  1 j for all i 2 f1;2g. Because
vi  1   j > x the normal types will not leave the market voluntarily and all exit must occur
through trade. The steady state equations imply:
(1   z1)L1 = N1m1n2pnn
(1   z2)L2 = N2m2n1pnn
However, N1m1n2pnn = N2m2n1pnn and (1   z1)L1 6= (1   z2)L2 leads to a contradiction.
Step 2. Step 1 implies that vi  1   j for some i. Suppose that vi < 1   j and vj > 1   i.
This conguration of outside options is covered by Lemma 1 which implies that both player
j and commitment type j trade with certainty with player i, i.e., pcn = pnn = 1, and receive
a payo close the i against player i. However, this implies that the commitment type j will
only leave the market through trade with player i for suciently small x(). The steady state
equations imply
(1   zj)Lj = mjNjpnnni (26)
zjLj = mjCjpcnni (27)
Lj = mjni(Njpnn + Cjpcn) (26+27)
The steady state equation for the player i implies
Li(1   zi) = miNi(njpnn + cjpcn) = mjni(Njpnn + Cjpcn) = Lj:
However, by assumption L1 > L2(1 z2) and L2 > L1(1 z1) contradicting the above equality.
Step 3. Suppose that v1 = 1   2 and v2 > 1   1. This implies that player 2 will never
trade with commitment type 1. Also, player 2 will only leave the market through trade since
v2 > 1   1 > x(). So,
(1   z2)L2 = m2N2pnnn1
(1   z1)L1  m1N1pnnn2 = m2N2pnnn1
However, this implies that (1   z1)L1  (1   z2)L2 which contradicts that (1   z1)L1 <
(1   z2)L2.
Step 4. Suppose that v1 > 1   2 and v2 = 1   1. The proof of this step is somewhat
lengthy so rst we sketch the argument. For a steady state to exist some commitment type 1s
must leave the market without trading, i,e, their value from remaining in the market must be
equal to x. To provide incentives for this pcn needs to be suciently small. However, if pcn is
suciently small compared to pnn, then the market is populated in large part by commitment
types. This, however, would imply that player 2's payo is also small and close to x(),
contradicting v2 = 1   1.BARGAINING AND REPUTATION 33
Observe that the equilibrium value for player 1
v1=e r1t()  m1pnn + (1   m1pnn)v1
v1 
e r1t()pnnm1




So, v1 > 1   2 implies that m1  (1   2)(1   e r1t()) and pnn  (1   2)(1   e r1t()).
The following are the steady state equations for class 1 agents
N1m1n2pnn = (1   z1)L1
C1m1n2pcn = L2(1   z2)   L1(1   z1)
Let  =
L2(1 z2) L1(1 z1)
(1 z1)L1 > 0. Dividing the rst equation by the second equation and using











(1   e r1t())(1   2)
(1   e r1t())(1   2) + 1
 c:
If c1  c > 0, then there exists time T, which is independent of x(), such that the normal
types trade or opt-out with probability 1 by time T. This is proved in Appendix C as a part
of the proof of Lemma 1.
If commitment type 1 trades with player 2, then the expected payo to the commitment type
1 conditional on trading is at least e r1T1. This is because after time T player 2 knows with
certainty that her opponent is the commitment type. At this point player 2 will either imme-
diately opt-out or immediately trade with commitment type 1. Also, in any trade commitment
type 1 receives 1.
In order for the steady state equations to hold commitment type 1 needs to be indierent
between voluntarily leaving and remaining in the market. Commitment type 1 receives at most
1 from player 2 so





Combining the upper bound for pcn given in the above equation with steady state equation
(28) for n1 implies
n1 
(1   e r1t())x()
pnnm1e r1t() (e r1T1   x()) + (1   e r1t())x()

(1   e r1t())x()
pnnm1e r1t() (e r1T1   x())
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The following gives a bound for player 2's equilibrium payo:
v2=e r2t()  n1pnn + c1pcn(1   1) + (1   (n1pnn + c1pcn))v2
Equations (28) and (29) implies that c1pcn = n1pnn substituting gives
v2=e r2t()  n1pnn(1 + (1   1)) + (1   n1pnn(1 + ))v2
v2 
e r2t()n1pnn(1 + (1   1))














(1   2)e r1t() (e r1T1   x())
:
However, lim!0 x()=(1   e r2t()) = 0, by assumption. Consequently, if  is suciently
small, then the right hand is also small and v2 < 1   1 leading to a contradiction. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Part (i): In this equilibrium, player 2 never opts out against com-
mitment types that are less greedy than 1, including 1. Player 2 never trades with the
commitment types greedier than 1. Player 1's outside option e r1t()v1 is strictly larger than
yielding to any commitment type. All commitment type 2s and all commitment type 1s who
are greedier than 1, voluntarily leave the market since they are never traded. In this case, the
bargaining game is governed by Lemma 1. Consequently, player 1's payo is at least 1  o()
and player 2's equilibrium value is at most 1   1 + o(). We can ensure that v1 > 1   2,
by choosing  suciently small. Also, pick the market tightness parameter for side 1 equal to
one, i.e., m1 = 1. Again, it is straightforward to choose t() suciently small so that v2 is
strictly greater than 
1+1
1 . Also, we can pick m2  1 to ensure that v2  1.
Part (ii): Theorem 2 immediate implies that vi  1   j for all i and j. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that, without loss of generality, player 1 is the player who opts
out according to condition (ii) in the denition of a SBU equilibrium. Let T = infft : 1(t) >
0g and let T = 1 if ft : 1(t) > 0g = ;. T denotes the rst point in time where player 1 opts
out. First, suppose that T = 1, then Proposition 1 in Abreu and Gul (2000) implies that
both agents concede at constant hazard rates 1 and 2 and complete yielding by a common
time ^ T < 1. Now suppose that T < 1. Condition (iii) requires that player 1 does not yield
after time T. Therefore, player 2's continuation payo at any time t > T is at most 1 1, so
she has no incentive to delay yielding beyond T and thus must complete yielding by time T.
Player 1's continuation payo at any time t > T is at most 1   2 because player 2 completes
her yielding by time T. Consequently, player 1 has no incentive to delay opting out or yielding
beyond time T and thus must complete yielding and opting out by time T. However, again
Proposition 1 in Abreu and Gul (2000) implies that the two agents concede at constant hazard
rates 1 and 2. Also, the previous discussion implies that both agents complete yielding byBARGAINING AND REPUTATION 35
time T. Consequently, in any SBU equilibrium both players concede at constant hazard rates
1 and 2 and complete yielding by some common time T < 1.
Condition (i) requires that neither player yields with an atom at time zero in a SBU
equilibrium. Because if player j yields with positive probability at time zero, then vi() =
Ui() > 1   j which would contradict condition (i). Consequently, in a SBU equilibrium
F1 (t) = 1 e 1t and F2 (t) = 1 e 2t for t  T. Since player 2 does not opt-out by assump-
tion and yields at rate 2, she completes her yielding at time T =  lnc2=2. Consequently,
both players complete yielding by time T =  lnc2=2 and equations (9) and (10) are satised
in a SBU equilibrium. Also, a steady state implies that equations (11) and (12) are satised in
a SBU equilibrium.
Recall z is such that z  1
2+1  1   z. Below we show that there exists a unique
pnc 2 [0;1] such that yielding equations (9) and (10) and steady state equations (11) and (12)
are satised. Also, we show that there exists a pnc 2 [0;1] such that equations (9) - (12) are
satised, only if player 1 is the weaker player in ^  (0;^ c). Consequently, this is the unique SBU
equilibrium, if player 1 is assumed to be the weaker player in ^  (0;^ c).12
Suppose that player 1 is weaker in ^  (0;^ c) and dene b2(pnc) using the following equation:
1   b2(pnc)e 2T(pnc) = 1   c2(pnc):
Substituting in for T(pnc) and c2(pnc) gives the following expression for b2(pnc)
b2(pnc) =
z2
z2 + pnc(1   z1   z2)

1   z2




A necessary condition for equilibrium is b2(pnc) = 1 since player 2 does not yield at time zero.
We show that there exists pnc such that b2(pnc) = 1. Notice if pnc = 0, then b2(pnc) = 1.
However, pnc = 0 is not an equilibrium. This is because pnc = 0 implies that c2 = 1 and thus
n2 = 0. This implies that player 1 neither trades with commitment type 2 (pncc2 = 0) nor
player 2 (pnnn2 = 0). Hence, v1 = 0. But this violates the condition that v1 = 1   2.
Rewrite the expression for b2(pnc) as follows:
b2(pnc) = f(k(pnc))1=1
where k(pnc) = z2 + pnc(1   z1   z2) and
f(k) = z
1
2 (1   z2)2k 1(1   k) 2:
If pnc = 1, then b2(1)  1 (since player 1 is weaker in ^  (0;^ c)). The function f(k) is strictly
convex and minimized at k = 1




1   z1   z2
12Since either player 1 or player 2 is the weaker player in ^  (0;^ c), our argument establishes that there is
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so that k(p) = 1
2+1. Our assumption that zi < z implies that p 2 (0;1). Also, notice
b2(p) < b2(0) = 1  b2(1). Consequently, the convexity of f implies that f is decreasing for
pnc < p and increasing for pnc > p. This implies that f(k(pnc)) < 1 for all pnc < p and there
exists a unique pnc 2 (p;1], such that b2(pnc) = 1. Note that if player 2 is strictly weaker in
^  (0;^ c), then b2(1) < 1 and so there does not exist pnc 2 (0;1] such that b2(pnc) = 1. Hence the
equilibrium is unique. 
Proof of Corollary 3. First, without loss of generality, we pick a subsequence where player
1 is the weaker player in ^  (0;^ ck) for all k. The argument for Theorem 3 implies that pk
nc  pk
for all k, where pk is dened in equation (30) in the proof of Theorem 3. Notice limk pk =
1=(1 + 2). Consequently, limk pk






















for all k. Consequently, limk b2(pk
nc) = 1. If limk bk
2(pk
nc) = 1, then the previous equation implies
that limk pk
nc = 0 or limk pk
nc = 1. However, limk pk
nc  1=(1+2) > 0 implies that limk pk
nc =
1. Also, limk pk
nc = 1 and equations (11) and (12) imply that limk ck
1 = limk ck
2 = 0. 
Appendix F. SBU equilibria: existence and convergence
Let f1(t) denote the probability that player 1 reveals rationality in period t. A &-SBU
equilibrium is a search equilibrium  with the following properties
(i) Player 2 trades with commitment type 1 with probability 1,
(ii) Player 1 opts out with positive probability in a period t only if
P
s>t f1(s) < &
(iii) v1 = 1   2 and v2 < 1   1.
F.1. Existence.
Theorem F.1. Assume that t()  K
p
 for some K >  where the constant  is dened as
in Lemma 2, lim!0 t() = 0, and suppose that z is dened as in equation (13). There exists
 such that if,  < , z1 < z and z2 < z, then there exists &() such for all & < &() a
&-SBU equilibrium exists.
Proof. We dene an \alternative" bargaining game, prove that a search equilibrium exists if
the players play this alternative game in the bargaining stage, and show that this equilibrium
is also an equilibrium for the original search economy.
Step 1. The alternative game.
Given exogenous payo function w : N ! R2, exogenous total break-up probability a, vector
of outside options v, and vector of commitment type probabilities c we dene the alterna-
tive game ^  (a;c;v;w). In the alternative game player 1 moves rst in the odd periods and
player 2 moves rst in the even periods. The player that moves rst has two actions available,BARGAINING AND REPUTATION 37
fR(eveal);I(nsist)g. If the player that moves rst chooses R, then the game ends and pay-
os are realized. If the player that moves rst chooses I, then the follower picks action from
fR(eveal);I(nsist)g. If she choses R, then the game ends and otherwise the game progresses
to the next period. Also, at any node in period t where player 1 moves the game ends with
probability 1(t). The opt-out probability 1(t) is a function of a and strategies. We dene
1(t) in Step 3. The function w : N ! R2 determines payos (before discounting) to each player
from revealing and being revealed to, at any period t, after a play of R by the player who speaks







i(t) is the payo to i from j revealing in period t. If the player that speaks second, player j,
reveals, then player i receives payo i and player j receives payo 1 i. If there is a break-up
in a period, then the agents receive e rit()vi as their payo. In this game the commitment
types never opt-out or take action R, and player i is the commitment type with probability ci.
The alternative game is interpreted as follows: the strategy insist corresponds to player i
asking for i and rejecting an oer of j by player j in the original game. Reveal corresponds
to player i proposing something dierent than 1 but on an equilibrium path for the game with
one-sided incomplete information in the original game. The exogenous continuation payos w
are chosen from the set of equilibrium payo vectors for the game with one-sided incomplete
information. The exogenously given opt-out probability a is incorporated into the game so that
player 1 only opts-out against the commitment type.
Step 2. Strategies in the alternative game. Let z = fF : N ! [0;1];F non-decreasingg, that
is z is the set of all sub-probability distribution functions over the set of natural numbers. Let
F(1) = limt!1 F(t). Let f denote the density of F, i.e., f(t) = F(t)   F(t   1). A strategy
for player 1 is a function F1 such that F1 2 z, and
P
t f1(t)  (1   c1)(1   a). A strategy for
player 2 is a function F2 2 z such that
P
t f2(t)  (1   c2).
Step 3. For any F 2 z for player 1 let t& denote the rst period such that F(t)  F(1) &.
For any exogenously given total opt-out probability a 2 [0;1] let
1(t;F;a) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
a
F(t&) (F(1) &)
& for t = t&;
a
f(t)
& for t > t&;
0 for t < t&:
Step 4. Utilities in the alternative game. Suppose player i uses strategy Fi. Dene 2(:) = 0.
In the following we drop the dependence of 1 on F1 and a when this does not cause any
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Step 5. The xed point operator . Dene correspondence  such that (F0;a0;c0;v0;w0) 2
(F;a;c;v;w) if and only if
a0 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1   p if v1 < 1   2;
0 if v1 > 1   2;
[0;1   p] otherwise:
F0











































p(F;a)z2 + (1   z1   z2)(1   a)
;
where p is dened in equation (30) in the proof of Theorem 3, p(F;a) = maxfpnn(F;a);1 g
and pnn(F;a) denotes the probability that player 1 and player 2 trade, given revelation prob-
abilities F1 and F2 and the opt-out probability 1(F1;a). The constant  is chosen suciently
small so that in the continuous time game considered in Theorem 3, if c1 and c2 are calculated
using pnn = 1    and pnc = p, player 1 is the stronger player and b2(p;) < 1.
Also, let i(F;a;t) denote the probability that player i is a commitment type given that player
i has not revealed rationality in history ht. The posterior probability i is obtained using Bayes'






j)(t)0 = fUi (i(F;a;t));Uj (i(F;a;t))g;
where fUi (i(F;a;t));Uj (i(F;a;t))g denotes the set of perfect equilibrium payo vectors in
the bargaining game with one-sided incomplete where player i reputation level is i(F;a;t) > 0.
Recall that (U1(1);U2(1)) is an upper-hemi continuous, convex and compact valued corre-
spondence (as a function of 1) by Lemma B.3.BARGAINING AND REPUTATION 39
The correspondence , as dened above is clearly upper hemi-continuous, compact and
convex-valued (in the product topology). Consequently, Glicksberg's xed point theorem im-
plies that a xed point, (F;a;c;v;w) exists.
Step 6. The remaining steps show that if & and  are suciently small, then (F;1(F1;a);c)
is an equilibrium, and v is the vector of values in this equilibrium, of the economy where the
bargaining stage game is the original bargaining game and the continuation equilibrium once one
player has revealed is chosen from the set of equilibria of the game with one-sided incomplete
information such that payos are according to w.
Step 7. Player 1's value v1  1   2. Also, a > 0.
If v1 > 1   2, then a = 0. If a = 0, then this game is identical to the bargaining game
without the options of opting-out. In this case, player 1 was chosen as the weaker player who
concedes with probability 1 b1  0. This implies that player 1's payo in the bargaining stage
is 1   2 with error o(
p
). Consequently, by Lemma 2 and because t() > K
p
, for  > 0
we have v1 < 1   2. However, this implies that a = 1   p > 0, a contradiction.
Step 8. We will show v2  (1 1) C(1 e r2t()) for some constant C which is independent
of . Player 2 can always reveal rationality immediately in period 1. This guarantees that player
2 will trade with the commitment type of class 1 in period 1. So, v2=e r2t()  c1(1   1) +
v2(1   c1). Rearranging
v2 
e r2t()(1   1)c1
1   (1   c1)e r2t() = 1   1  
(1   1)(1   e r2t())
1   (1   c1)e r2t()  1   1  
1   e r2t()
c1
However, the formulation of the xed point operator  implies that c1 
z1=(1 )
z1=(1 )+1 (z1+z2).
Consequently, v2  (1   1)   C(1   e r2t()) for some constant C which is independent of .
Step 9. The probability that player 1 and player 2 trade, pnn(F;a;c)  1   C, where
C is a constant independent of . Consequently, commitment type probabilities c1  c1 =
z1=(1 C)
z1=(1 C)+1 (z1+z2) and c2  c2 =
z2=(1 C)
z2=(1 C)+(1 z1 z2).
Player 2 will complete her yielding by the latest in period t& for suciently small &. This is
because the probability that player 1 yields by at most & in any of these periods. Consequently,
player 2 will do strictly better by completing yielding in period t& + 1 than in any period
t > t& + 1.
Suppose that player 2 reveals rationality with probability p > C in period t&. Observe that
player 1 reveals with positive probability in period t& by the denition of this period.
Suppose that period t& is a period where player 1 is proposing. Instead of revealing rationality
in t&, player 1 can wait until t& + 1, and reveal rationality with certainty then, if player 2 has
not revealed yet. This strategy can not do any better than revealing rationality in t&. This
implies that
1   2 +   1(1   p)(1   2) + 1p:
This inequality cannot hold for C suciently large.40 ATAKAN AND EKMEKCI
Suppose that period t& is a period where player 1 is responding. However, since player 2
is revealing with probability p in t& player 1 will not reveal in periods t&   1 or t&   2, if C
is suciently large. Since he does not reveal, his reputation level does not change in the two
prior periods. This implies that player 2 is better of revealing in period t&  2, if such a period
exists. If such a period does not exist, then player 1 must be revealing with probability of at
least F1(1)   & in period t&. Notice for  small e r2t() is close to 1 and so v2 is close 1   2.
This implies, however, that if player 1 is revealing with probability F1(1) & in period t&, then
player 2 will do better by not revealing in period t&.
Player 2 can not reveal with probability more than C in period t& + 1 either. If player
2 was to reveal with probability greater than C, then player 1 will not reveal in period t&.
However, this contradicts the denition of period t& which requires that player 1 reveal with
positive probability in this period. Consequently, the probability that player 2 reveals in period
t  t& is at most 2C. Redening C implies that pnn  1   C.
Step 10. The bounds in the operator  are not binding, a 2 (0;1   p), v1 = 1   2; and
v2 < 1   1. Consequently, (F;1(F1;a);c) is an equilibrium, and v is the vector of values
in this equilibrium, of the economy where the bargaining stage game is the original bargaining
game and the continuation equilibrium once one player has revealed is chosen from the set of
equilibria of the game with one-sided incomplete information such that payos are according to
w.
Suppose that v1 < 1   2, then a = 1   p. Revelations need to occur at rate 1 and 2 by
Lemma 2. However, p is chosen such that if revelations occur at rate 1 and 2, then for 
small player 2 is the player that reveals with a jump in the rst two periods. Moreover, player
2's probability of revelation approaches 1   b2 > 0. This would imply that v1 > 1   2 for
suciently small . Consequently, v1 = 1   2 and a 2 (0;1   p). Notice that since t() is
larger than 
p
, player 2 needs to be the player that reveals rationality with a jump in the
rst two periods, i.e., b2 < 1 and b1 = 1 as dened in Lemma 2. This however, implies that
player 2's value v2 < 1   2. 
F.2. Convergence of discrete time &-SBU equilibria to a continuous time SBU equi-
librium. Let z denote the constants dened in equation (13) and let  > 0 be the cuto
chosen in Theorem F.1. Suppose that z1 < z and z2 < z. Let (Fn
1 ;n;Fn
2 ;vn;cn) denote a se-
quence of &n-SBU equilibria for the economy where the period length is n > 0 where n < .
Suppose limn!1 n = 0 and consequently t()n ! 0. Also, suppose that limn!1 &n = 0. Such
a sequence of equilibria exists by Theorem F.1.
Remark F.1. By construction cn





tT (t)n = 1 and
Fn
2 (T)
1 c2 = 1, for all n. Hence, the sub-probability distributions
(Fn
1 ;n;Fn
2 ) have uniformly bounded support [0;T]. Consequently, Helly's theorem (Billings-
ley (1995), Theorem 25.9) implies that (Fn
1 ;n;Fn
2 ;vn;cn) has a convergent subsequence. Let
(F1;;F2;v;c) denote a sub-sequential limit.BARGAINING AND REPUTATION 41
Theorem F.2. The limit (F1;;F2) is a SBU equilibrium for the continuous time bargaining
stage-game where the vector of commitment type probabilities is c, v is the equilibrium values
given that the SBU equilibrium (F1;;F2) is played in the bargaining stage-game, and the vector
c satises the steady state equations.
Proof. Step 1. F1 and F2 do not have common discontinuity points. Also, G = F1 + and F2
do not have common discontinuity points.












> > > <
> > > :
i if t > k;
1   j if t < k;
1=2 if t = k:
F1, F2 and G do not have common discontinuity points consequently Billingsley (1995) The-






U2(t;k)dF1(t)dF2(k). Also, v1 =
limUn
1




Step 3. The functions (F1;;F2) comprise a SBU equilibrium for the continuous time war
of attrition with opt-outs.
The vector cn and an satisfy the steady state equations for all n. Hence, c and a satisfy the
steady state equations.The probability that player 1 and player 2 trades pn
nn  1 Cn where
C is independent of n. Hence, limn pn
nn = 1. The values vn
1 = 1 2 and vn
2  1 1 for all n.
Hence, v1 = 1   2 and v2  1   1. However, v2 cannot be strictly less than 1   1 since she
can guarantee 1 1 in the bargaining game and search is costless at the limit. So, v2 = 1 1
and condition (i) is satised. Condition (ii) is satised by construction since player 2 never
opts out. Condition (iii) is also satised since the probability that an opt-out and a revelation
occur in the same period is at most &n in a &n-SBU equilibrium and limn!1 &n = 0.
We now show that (F1;) and F2 are mutual best responses. F1 does not jump at T and
pnc > p by construction. In the continuous time war of attrition, if player 1 is behaving
according to F1;, then for each , there is a N such that for all n > N, Fn
2 is an  best
response to F1; and consequently, since  is arbitrary F2 is a best response to F1;. Also, the
symmetric argument is true for player 2 showing that F1; is a best response to F2. Proving
that F1; and F2 is an equilibrium. Since the war of attrition has a unique equilibrium with
pnc > p, F1; and F2 coincide with this equilibrium. This argument is identical to Abreu and
Gul (2000), proof of Proposition 4, on page 114 where a more detailed proof may be found. 
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